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JEFFREY K. MACKIE-MASON
Abstract. There are well-known circumstances under which unilateral re-
fusals to license will cause harm to competition, that is, will lower consumer
welfare. However, when the strategy is profitable, refusals to license also in-
crease the returns to intellectual property, and thus limitations on them will
reduce the incentives for firms to invest in innovation. The optimal balance
between innovation incentives and protection against static monopoly harm
is not knowable to any reasonable degree of precision. Economists may be
able to identify some special cases in which the desired rule is unambiguously
knowable, but these cases will be few.
Given a policy or legal rule, economists can help interpret and apply the
rule. Analysis of recent legal statements on the treatment of refusals to license
shows that some of the current confusion and frustration in this area can be
attributed to failure to formulate the rules in terms of the economic purposes
of the underlying statutes. Some attempts to delineate a boundary between
cases in which intellectual property protection is absolute and those in which
antitrust restrictions may be imposed are based on logical or semantic distinc-
tions that are not related to the economic issues. These attempts will fail to
resolve the confusion.
1. Introduction
It is probably an exaggeration to say that there is no situation more frustrating
to more antitrust practitioners today — both economists and lawyers — than the
conflict between antitrust and intellectual property law swirling around refusals
to license intellectual property. Probably an exaggeration, but perhaps not. This
confusion over the current state of the law, and the disagreement about what the
law should be for this problem, is certainly very prominent in the minds of those
who practice antitrust analysis in high tech industries, and high tech antitrust in
turn has grabbed a dominant share of recent attention.
In this paper I argue that the conflict is inevitable: the two policies are designed
to further two different instruments toward a common economic objective, and those
instruments necessarily come into conflict. Intellectual property policy is intended
to create incentives to invest in further invention and authorship, which are expected
to raise consumer welfare. But the form of these incentives tends to induce short-
term allocative inefficiencies, which in turn lowers consumer welfare. Resolving the
two policies in order to achieve their common goal of maximizing consumer welfare
is not feasible because it requires theoretical and empirical knowledge that are well
beyond our capabilities.
The optimal balance between enhancing innovation incentives by permitting
some refusals to license, and protecting consumers from allocative inefficiency by
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prohibiting other refusals is not likely to be found, but that is not the end of the
story. It is relatively uncontroversial that some refusals to license can cause suffi-
cient harm to competition that they should be restricted. Although any particular
policy specifying the boundary between permissible and impermissible refusals will
be somewhat arbitrary, there is still much positive work for economists and lawyers
to do. First, we can provide some limited guidance on those situations in which the
correct boundary is reasonably clear cut. Second, we can develop an economic and
legal framework in which to effectively interpret and implement the current law,
whatever it may be.
There is much work to be done: the current situation is very unsettled, result-
ing in inconsistent decisions and a high degree of uncertainty for investors, which
is likely to chill innovation efforts. In sections 3 and 4 below I discuss some of
the problems that exist for coherent economic interpretation of recent case law.
Throughout, I argue that satisfactory resolution of these challenges requires ad-
herence to the centrality of the economic purposes of the antitrust and intellectual
property laws.
2. The (not so) simple welfare economics of refusals to license
The economic effects of a refusal to license can be divided between two general
types: direct effects on current consumers, and indirect effects on future consumers.
Without much loss these may be thought of as the antitrust and innovation effects,
respectively; they can also be loosely thought of as the static and dynamic effects.
I will discuss each in turn, then discuss how taken together they determine the net
economic welfare impact of a refusal to license.
2.1. Direct effects on end consumers. Direct effects on end consumers are
the purview of traditional antitrust analysis. As a consequence of a refusal to
license, consumers may face higher prices than they would absent the refusal. Under
other circumstances, a license refusal might result in a restricted range of product
varieties, or lower product quality than would obtain absent the refusal. Each of
these results in a reduction of consumer welfare, and raises the possibility that there
might be antitrust injury.
Of course, there may be pro-competitive effects of the refusal, and generally
both economists and courts believe that pro-competitive and anti-competitive ef-
fects should be weighed against each other to determine whether the net effect on
consumers is harmful. For example, a single refusal might lead to higher product
quality, but also higher prices than in the alternative. In this situation it would not
be obvious a priori whether consumer welfare has been increased or decreased.
For example, in In re: Independent Service Organizations (CSU v. Xerox), Xerox
refused to sell its patented high-speed copier repair parts to independent service
organizations (ISOs), a policy it defended as a refusal to license the embedded
intellectual property. The ISOs complained that they were unable to effectively
compete in the provision of repair service without access to Xerox parts. They
alleged that end consumers were harmed because service prices were higher, and
the variety of service contracts available was diminished. Xerox countered that its
strategy was pro-competitive because it could ensure higher quality service as both
the manufacturer and the service provider.
It is by now well-understood that not all refusals to license are harmful to con-
sumers on balance, even when implemented by a firm that has monopoly power in a
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meaningful market. This is an example of the ambiguity associated more generally
with the consumer welfare consequences of vertical restrictions, of which refusals to
license are but one example. However, there is substantial agreement that under
certain circumstances a net harm to consumer welfare is possible.
Limiting ourselves for the moment to traditional antitrust analysis of direct ef-
fects on consumers, it is helpful to note that a refusal to license is economically
equivalent to a refusal to deal by a firm that does not have intellectual property
rights over the good or process. Certainly, without intellectual property right pro-
tections, the firm may find that there are good substitutes for its product. However,
the same may be true for protected intellectual property as well: there may be alter-
native processes or products that are desirable substitutes for the protected process
or good.1
Carlton [3] recently provided a useful summary of some circumstances under
which a refusal to deal (or license) could create a net anticompetitive harm. In one
situation a dominant firm forecloses enough of the distribution channel that a com-
petitor cannot achieve necessary economies of scale. In another situation, treated
by Whinston [8], a monopolist offers one product that is sometimes but not always a
complement to a different product in which the monopolist competes for sales with
a second firm. If the second firm needs to achieve scale economies, the monopolist
may be able to exclude its competitor by denying it customers from the group who
want the monopolist’s first product as a complement. Borenstein, MacKie-Mason
and Netz [2] show that a refusal by a monopolist to sell a complement could harm
consumer welfare even without the ancillary conditions required by Whinston, as
long as the same result cannot be implemented by a price discrimination scheme.2
In short, there is general agreement that there are various circumstances under
which a unilateral refusal to license can harm consumer welfare, and thus raise
anticompetitive concerns. For the purpose of building up the conceptual roadmap,
a simplification will be useful: refusals to license can have adverse effects on static
allocative efficiency. Although the effect of a refusal in one market may be felt in
another market, the bottom line is the same: consumers will face higher prices, less
variety or lower quality than they would absent the refusal.
2.2. Indirect effects on future consumption. Refusals to license may also have
indirect effects on the welfare of consumers in the future, through affecting the
incentives to invest in risky innovation projects. I find it useful to distinguish
between two effects on innovation incentives, which I call “local” and “global”.
Local effects are those on the firm or firms active in the particular market of interest.
Global effects are those on the innovation activities of firms in general.
Global effects on innovation incentives are more readily familiar, because these
are the core concern of intellectual property policy. Article I, Section 8 of the Con-
stitution delegates to Congress the power to grant authors and inventors exclusive
rights “to promote the progress of science and useful arts”. The logic is simple:
1As an example, witnesses in the proceedings of ITS et al. v. Kodak testified that Kodak
”image loops” functioned as a highly effective substitute for Xerox’s patented ”photoreceptor
belts”.
2Kodak maintained in ITS et al. v. Kodak that it could have achieved the same outcome as
its refusal to deal policy by raising the price on parts sufficiently. However, Kodak wanted to sell
parts to self-servicers at lower prices, and thus the Robinson-Patman Act likely prohibited this
alternative policy.
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an exclusive right to make, use or vend a patented good or process (or to copy a
copyrighted work) will tend to secure some rents for the right holder. Anticipation
of such rents will induce investment in new creation.
To the extent that refusal to license is a valuable strategy to some firms, in some
circumstances, the option to exercise this strategy raises the expected rents from
successful innovation. Thus, each individual case in which a refusal to license is
permitted has a global effect, by raising the expected rents from innovation generally
(albeit perhaps not by very much).
Local effects are the dynamic consequence of the static allocative effects I dis-
cussed in the previous subsection. A firm that employs refusal to license as a
strategy, if it succeeds, will sometimes reduce the competition it faces in one or
more markets. One consequence of reduced competition is that there may be either
more or less subsequent innovative effort in that market. There is a long economic
literature on the question of whether there is more incentive to innovate in monop-
olized or competitive markets. On the one hand, a monopoly gets to capture more
of the gains from the innovations it develops, and thus might seem to have a greater
incentive to invest. On the other hand, competitive firms may need to try harder
to innovate in order to differentiate themselves, deliver greater customer value, and
ultimately survive. Although the theories are more complicated than this, the basic
ambiguity should be evident: permitting greater consolidation of market power in
a market may increase or decrease innovative activity in that market.
As an aside, I believe that there is a notable asymmetry in how antitrust law
treats the local innovation effects. It is common for a court to view harm to
innovation as a form of antitrust injury, and thus as one of the necessary elements
for a violation.3 However, I aware of very few cases in which greater innovative
effort by a monopolist was valued sufficiently to excuse exclusionary conduct.4
2.3. What is the economically optimal policy towards refusals to license?
Refusals to license in some situations will lower the welfare of consumers in the
market or markets at issue through higher prices, less variety or lower quality.
When this happens, the corresponding increase in market power of the intellectual
property owner may lead to greater or lesser innovative effort by that firm and its
actual or potential competitors. Consumers, of course, often benefit from greater
innovative effort.5 Further, a regime which is permissive of refusals to license will
lead investors in general to expect higher average returns to risky investments in
innovation, and thus the overall level of innovation may increase (not just in the
markets directly involved).
From the preceding summary, the answer to the title of this subsection should
be obvious: the optimal policy towards refusals to license depends on the balance of
hard-to-measure benefits and hard-to-measure costs. Thus, the answer necessarily
is empirical. The tightness of the rule on refusals to license should, apparently, de-
pend on quantitative assessments of such questions as: How much static allocative
3Arguably, this was the only harm to consumers found by the court in U.S. v. Microsoft.
4As we observe the twilight years of the offspring of the once astonishing Bell Labs, do we
think it may have been a mistake to force the breakup of AT&T?
5It is important to remember, however, that more innovative effort is not always a good
thing. First, there is a socially optimal rate of innovative effort, and it is possible to overinvest
in innovation just as in anything else. Second, some firms with market power might distort the
direction of innovative effort, focusing on innovations that increase their power and profits without
necessarily increasing consumer welfare.
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inefficiency results across firms, across industries, across time? How much addi-
tional return on investment will be expected on average for a given loosening of
restrictions on refusals to license, and how much additional innovation effort will
that incremental expected return induce, and how much future consumer welfare
will that incremental investment induce?
I will be blunt: economic science is not even close to being able to do the
measurements necessary to assert with any meaningful specificity what the optimal
refusal to license policy should be. The problem is especially acute because it
is both ex ante and global in nature. That is, a significant part of the benefit
from broadly permitting refusals to license is indirect: the innovative effort induced
across all industries from increased expectations of future reward. Thus, we cannot
merely examine the data for a single industry after a refusal to license and try to
assess whether consumers were better or worse off in that instance. Rather, we
must estimate the relationship between different refusal to license policy variations
and the expected incremental rents to innovation investment, on average.
This is not a new problem. The same problem has festered for many years in a
related context: what is the optimal life for a patent? The tradeoff is essentially
the same: more years of allocative inefficiency in exchange for higher incentives to
invest in innovation. Nordhaus [5] tried valiantly to estimate the number of years
that optimally balances the two, but his work, in the end, was not much more than
illustrative. I had a similar experience in related work with Jerry Hausman [4], in
which we tried to calculate how the optimal patent life would respond to a more or
less restrictive rule on price discrimination.
This somewhat dismal assessment leaves economists with two primary roles to
play. First, we can try to nibble away at the problem, even if we cannot do sufficient
measurement to determine the policy that is optimal (on economic grounds). In
particular, we can try to delineate situations in which the anticompetitive costs of
a refusal to license unambiguously exceed, or unambiguously do not exceed, the
pro-competitive benefits from greater returns to intellectual property. Second, we
can try to clarify how to correctly analyze a given case given a particular rule as
found in the law. That is, we can try to suggest economically sensible improvements
to legal rules and their applications, or we can try to suggest economically sensible
interpretations or applications of existing rules.
Economists regularly try to carve out parts of a problem for which the policy
prescription is unambiguous. This is the tack that Carlton [3] takes in his analysis
of refusals to deal. Such analyses can be quite helpful to our understanding, and to
the design and enforcement of policy. Caution is needed, however. Most research
on competition issues by applied industrial organization economists is theoretical,
and yet many, perhaps most, of the hard questions to be resolved in specific cases
are empirical. In addition, in order to be tractable and elegant, theoretical analyses
necessarily abstract from the complexities of real cases.
One thread running through the modern history of antitrust economics has been
the pronouncement of simple, elegant, strong theoretical results that have later
fallen. For example, one of the defining pronouncements of the “Chicago School”
was that it is only possible to extract one monopoly profit, and thus that firms
could gain no more profit, nor do more harm to consumer welfare, through tying.
In the ensuing years economists have realized that there are realistic circumstances
under which tying is anticompetitive; [8] is a leading example.
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The controversy over the implications of a refusal to deal for aftermarkets is an-
other example of the risk of relying on seductively simple theories pronouncing the
“impossibility” of anticompetitive consequences from certain strategies. Economists
argued that foremarket or “systems” competition for durable goods would neces-
sarily protect aftermarket consumers, a theory that was relied on by Justice Scalia
in his Kodak dissent. However, [1], [2] demonstrated that this theory was sim-
ply incorrect on its face, and even Kodak’s expert economist acknowledged in a
scholarly publication that in this and at least three other situations aftermarkets
can be profitably monopolized [7]. The argument thenceforth, by Kodak’s experts
and by Kodak in its appeal, was that the issue was empirical. Consistent with
the Supreme Court’s holding on summary judgment, the court needed to assess
whether the case-specific facts indicated that the likely net harm was sufficient to
justify antitrust intervention.
Thus, simple proscriptions against intervention in refusal to license situations
should be viewed skeptically. Of course, there are some easy boundary cases. I
think nearly all economists would agree that a firm without market power should
not be required to license. More generally, it may be that most refusals to license
by firms with market power are harmless, or at least that the harm is less than the
benefits due to increased incentives for innovation. But simple theoretical models
cannot alone determine the truth of this proposition.
The second feasible task for economists that I described above is to help make
sense of the law as it is written, and to develop tests and principles for applying
it coherently to economic conduct. I will now pursue this goal, although within
the confines of this paper I continue to maintain a skeptical position in order to
emphasize the unhappily unsettled state of this nexus of antitrust and intellectual
property law.
3. Making economic sense of the legal boundary between IP
protection and antitrust
To say that the current case law on refusals to license intellectual property is
confusing would be a kindness. As an economist, I leave it to the lawyers to
characterize the problem in detail; see, e.g., [6]. The apparently irreconcilable
decisions of the Ninth Circuit in Kodak v. ITS et al. and the Federal Circuit in CSU
v. Xerox alone have left practitioners wringing their hands. In this section I limit
myself to some specific guidance recent courts have offered on a boundary between
legal and potentially illegal licence refusals, and raise some economic concerns with
this proposed boundary.
In 1988 Congress amended the patent law and declared that “no patent owner
shall be deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of
having refused to license or use any rights to the patent” (35 USC 271(d)(4)). On
its face, this language appears to be clear and unambiguous: at least for patented
intellectual property, owners may refuse to license without limit. However, this
section of the act is concerned with conduct that might invalidate a patent (“mis-
use”), and the courts have been clear that Congress did not intend to overturn prior
case law that found patent rights to be limited rights, circumscribed in part by the
antitrust laws.
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This issue was recently addressed head-on by the DC Court of Appeals in U.S. v.
Microsoft. Microsoft argued for an unlimited right to license and refuse to license
its intellectual property at will. The Court wrote:
The company claims an absolute and unfettered right to use its
intellectual property as it wishes: “If intellectual property rights
have been lawfully acquired,” it says, then “their subsequent ex-
ercise cannot give rise to antitrust liability.” Appellant’s Opening
Br. at 105. That is no more correct than the proposition that use
of one’s personal property, such as a baseball bat, cannot give rise
to tort liability. As the Federal Circuit succinctly stated: “Intellec-
tual property rights do not confer a privilege to violate the antitrust
laws.” In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322,
1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Although the courts agree that antitrust law does impose some restrictions on the
use (or non-use) of protected intellectual property, it is much less clear when those
restrictions apply. Indeed, the Federal Circuit, cited above as succinctly stating that
the antitrust laws restrict intellectual property rights is widely believed to have held
that Xerox’s intellectual property rights could not be limited by antitrust claims.
The courts have frequently proposed that the boundary between legal exercise of
intellectual property rights and conduct that might violate the antitrust laws should
coincide with the “scope of the patent”. For example, the Ninth Circuit quoted the
Supreme Court when it wrote in Kodak that “This basic right of exclusion does
have limits.. . . [T]he right of exclusion [does not] protect an attempt to extend a
lawful monopoly beyond the grant of a patent. See Mercoid, 320 U.S. at 665.”
There seems to be some disagreement about what the scope or extent of the
patent grant means when it comes to antitrust restrictions, but in its recent decision
the Ninth Circuit went on to write that “Section 2 of the Sherman Act condemns
exclusionary conduct that extends natural monopolies into separate markets. Much
depends, therefore, on the definition of the patent grant and the relevant market.”
This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s earlier statement in the Kodak sum-
mary judgment proceeding: “[We have] held many times that power gained through
some natural advantage such as a patent, copyright, or business acumen can give
rise to liability if ’a seller exploits his dominant position in one market to expand his
empire into the next.”’ (504 U.S. at 480 n.29, quoting Times-Picayune Publishing
Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611, 97 L. Ed. 1277, 73 S. Ct. 872 (1953).)
The boundary implies that refusals to license find a safe harbor when exercised
within the scope of the patent grant, or within the market relevant for the patented
good or process. In Kodak the Ninth Circuit states this (albeit in language that
might permit more expansive interpretation): “We find no reported case in which
a court has imposed antitrust liability for a unilateral refusal to sell or license a
patent or copyright. Courts do not generally view a monopolist’s unilateral refusal
to license a patent as ‘exclusionary conduct.’ See Data General, 36 F.3d at 1186
(citing Miller Insituform, Inc. v. Insituform of North America, 830 F.2d 606, 609
(6th Cir. 1987) (’A patent holder who lawfully acquires a patent cannot be held
liable under Section 2 of the Sherman Act for maintaining the monopoly power he
lawfully acquired by refusing to license the patent to others’)” (125 F.3d 1195 at
1216).
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It might seem from these cases that we now have clear guidance that economists
can implement. We know how to define relevant markets for antitrust analysis;
indeed, there is perhaps more agreement on the principles of market definition
than on any other issue in the field. The economist can determine the boundaries
of the markets, and then, if the refusal to license is having an effect on competition
in a market other than its own, it will be a candidate for antitrust intervention.
In fact, I do not think the matter is so simple. Consider the following hypothet-
ical, which does not correspond to the facts of the major aftermarkets refusal to
license (or deal) cases, but is close enough to be interesting: A durable equipment
manufacturer also offers service on its equipment. In order to compete better in
the market for service it innovates on some parts to make them less costly to re-
place, and it also develops some innovative tools (say, diagnostic software) to assist
its service technicians. All of these innovations are protected by patents and/or
copyright.6 The courts have generally found that replacement parts and service
labor constitute separate markets. Does that mean a refusal to license or sell these
parts and tools would be illegal if it had an adverse effect on competition in the
service market, since the intellectual property protection does not extend beyond
the boundaries of the service market?
The Federal Circuit does not think so: It found in Xerox that because the
diagnostics at issue were developed for use in providing service, refusing to license
them to competing service providers was within the scope of the patent grant.
Economist can breathe a sigh of relief if the boundary is defined in terms of the
market for the protected intellectual property and other markets, because we know
how to define these.7 However, there does not seem to be universal agreement that
Congress meant the scope of patent or other intellectual property protection to be
identical with antitrust market boundaries. If the correct boundary for antitrust
concern is some other definition of the “scope” of the intellectual property grant,
I think we are in trouble. I am aware of no coherent economic analysis that gives
precise operational meaning to the concept of scope.
Clearly it does not make sense to say that the scope is determined by the pur-
pose for which the intellectual property was developed. In commercial settings, it
generally will be fair to say that the purpose is to make as much money as possible
through the use of the innovation!
Patterson [6] suggests a distinction on which to base a determination of patent
scope: protection against use versus use to accumulate power. He argues that
the purpose of intellectual property protection is to protect innovators against the
use of their intellectual property by others, which would reduce the returns to
the innovator. But, he further argues, protection does not extend to using the
intellectual property to coerce or otherwise obtain power in another market. Thus,
for the case of refusals to license, a refusal that serves the purpose of protecting the
firm against use of its intellectual property would be permissible, but a refusal in
order to leverage power would not.
Patterson argues this principle prohibits the refusals to license or sell parts by
Kodak, Xerox and others. The service firms, he believes, did not have any use for
6A similar example appears in [3].
7The definitions may not be easy or devoid of controversy, of course! For example, though the
courts seem persuaded that parts and service for durable equipment are separate markets, this
conclusion is quite controversial among economists.
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the intellectual property embodied in parts – they merely needed the parts that
their customers wanted, in order to provide service to the customers. The only party
using the intellectual property is the end customer (who gains the advantages of
better-functioning or lower cost parts), but the equipment manufacturers are not
trying to prevent end customers from using the intellectual property. Rather, they
are trying to gain power in a market that distributes the parts to end customers.
I am not convinced that this principle is very workable. First, I do not see
that it adequately resolves the hypothetical above, in which parts innovations are
developed precisely to improve the quality or lower the cost of service. In this case
it would seem that the independent service companies would be using the embodied
intellectual property if they obtained the parts, and thus would fall into Patterson’s
safe harbor for a refusal to license. But once these two very similar examples fall
on opposite sides of the boundary, there is a slippery slope, and it would seem
impossible to find a sufficiently operational dividing line.
More important, at least to an economist, is that neither Patterson’s proposal,
nor the notion of patent scope as it is used by the courts, has any economic ra-
tionale. This brings us back to the initial problem discussed in section 2. The
purpose of the intellectual property laws is to secure rents for innovators and au-
thors, as encouragement to undertake costly and risky investments. I am aware
of no economic argument that the correct amount of expected rent is provided if
the property right is unlimited only within the “scope” of the grant, but is limited
outside the scope. The economically optimal amount of incentive to innovate de-
pends on many things: the average likelihood of success, the average value to end
consumers that flows from new innovations, the average cost in the form of alloca-
tive inefficiencies that flows from the legal monopoly that is granted, and so forth.
There is simply no reason that a logically (or worse yet, semantically) constructed
“scope” for an unlimited right to refuse a license will even approximate the socially
optimal amount of innovation incentives.
4. Case study: Making sense of Intel
I will illustrate the issues discussed above with a discussion of issues two recent
refusal to license cases against Intel: U.S. v. Intel (the FTC case) and Intergraph
v. Intel. These cases were largely identical on the facts and allegations. The FTC
brought its case on behalf of the government, seeking injunctive relief. Among its
allegations were that Intel had refused to license some of its intellectual property
to Intergraph, a leading manufacturer of high-end graphic workstations for use in
computer-aided design work.8 The FTC settled its case and entered a consent
decree with Intel. Intergraph alleged the same illegal conduct, sought additional
injunctive restrictions, and monetary damages for lost profits.
The central allegation was that Intel refused to license or make available some of
its intellectual property unless Intergraph gave Intel a zero-royalty license to some
of its intellectual property. Intergraph believed that Intel was infringing its “Clip-
per” microprocessor patents, and had sought royalties. When Intel refused to pay
royalties, Intergraph filed a patent infringement suit. Intel allegedly retaliated by
8The FTC also alleged that Intel made very similar refusals to Digital Equipment (DEC) and
to Compaq.
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refusing to supply crucial technical information it typically provided to workstation
manufacturers, and had previously provided to Intergraph.9
Intergraph’s antitrust claims were dismissed by the Federal Circuit on proce-
dural grounds. The Federal Circuit held that Intergraph did not have standing to
sue Intel for monopolization of a microprocessor market, because Intergraph was
not a participant in that market. Quite recently Intel settled with Intergraph on
the patent infringement claims, with an agreement to pay between $300 and $550
million, along with agreements between the parties to enter various cross-licenses.
Was Intel’s refusal within the scope of its various patent grants and other intel-
lectual property protections? The intellectual property, for our purposes, related to
the design and manufacture of microprocessors. Intergraph was not in the business
of manufacturing microprocessors, and there was no indication that it was contem-
plating entering that business. Indeed, several years before it had consciously de-
cided not to manufacture its own microprocessors based on the Clipper technology,
choosing instead to design its workstations to work exclusively with Intel micropro-
cessors. The antitrust damages alleged by Intergraph were not harm to its ability to
manufacture microprocessors or compete with Intel, but profits lost because it could
no longer compete effectively in the manufacture of high-end workstations without
access to the technical information that Intel provided to Intergraph’s competitors.
Suppose we believe the scope of the intellectual property grants is equivalent to
the relevant market boundary for antitrust analysis, as suggested by Supreme Court
and the Ninth Circuit in the two Kodak proceedings. This might give Intel some
comfort: the protected intellectual property was clearly relevant to the production
of microprocessors, and the FTC and Intergraph were alleging monopolization of
microprocessors. Intel’s refusal to license seems to fall within the Insituform rule:
“A patent holder who lawfully acquires a patent cannot be held liable under Section
2 of the Sherman Act for maintaining the monopoly power he lawfully acquired by
refusing to license the patent to others” (Miller Insituform, Inc. v. Insituform of
North America, 830 F.2d 606, 609 (6th Cir. 1987)).
On the other hand, consider the facts of this particular case: Intergraph also
had presumptively valid intellectual property, and Intel was allegedly trying to
deny Intergraph the right to control its property. It is also important to remember
that although Intergraph was not and did not intend to be in the microprocessor
business, the Clipper patents did cover microprocessor technology that competed
with some of Intel’s property (indeed, Intergraph was elsewhere alleging that Intel
misappropriated Intergraph’s technology because it was superior to Intel’s). Can we
accept a definition of “scope” that permits one firm to use its intellectual property
to coerce another firm to relinquish competing intellectual property?
This conundrum is connected to the issue of the optimal balance between incen-
tives to innovate and allocative inefficiencies. Intel’s strategy of refusing to license
presumably increased the expected rents to its innovations, which has a positive
effect on the general expectation of rents to new innovation. However, its strat-
egy also lowers the expected rents to the innovations of Intergraph (and DEC and
Compaq, &c.). I do not believe that as a matter of theory it can be shown that
9This summary is extremely incomplete. Intergraph alleged that Intel was not only monop-
olizing a market for Windows-compatible microprocessors, but also a market for x86-compatible
chipsets. Intergraph also alleged that Intel engaged in various illegal acts that were not refusals
to license. These other issues are beyond the scope of this paper.
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the private returns to Intel of this strategy will necessarily be such that Intel only
implements this kind of refusal to license when the net social welfare effect on inno-
vation (combining the effect of the gain to Intel with the loss to other innovators)
is positive.
Suppose we instead adopt Patterson’s proposed criterion: that protection against
use is permissible, but a refusal in order to accumulate power is not. It appears
that Intel’s refusal to license was not to protect its intellectual property in the
design and production of microprocessors. Rather, it was to accumulate (or at
least maintain, which is essentially the same thing for antitrust purposes) power in
the microprocessor market. Thus, the Patterson criterion would oppose this refusal
to license. I do not find this apparently unambiguous result reassuring, because
it is arbitrary with respect to the economic purposes of intellectual property and
antitrust policy. That is, this rule may (sometimes) be workable, but it lacks a
principled basis.
5. Concluding remarks
The Intel cases are instructive because the issues seem stark, but their resolution
is murky. Intel was previously providing its intellectual property to Intergraph, and
never alleged that Intergraph misused that property. Thus, there is no reason to
think that Intel’s refusal was motivated by a concern for the safety of its intellectual
property. Further, Intel did not merely refuse to license. It refused to license (al-
legedly) in order to coerce Intergraph to give away its valuable intellectual property.
Despite what at first glance seems to be conduct outside the scope of the patent,
and for the purpose of accumulating economic power, not protecting its intellec-
tual property from misuse, it turns out to be very difficult to formulate a coherent
boundary between protected and unprotected refusals to license that resolves the
issues in this case.
Most important, I believe, is that any of the approaches discussed above for
resolving this conflict between intellectual property and antitrust policy, as well
as others of which I am aware, share a serious flaw: they are not grounded on
the economic purposes of the underlying policies. Intel’s strategy allegedly was
intended to increase the profitability of its microprocessor business. But this, of
course, is precisely what is intended by the intellectual property laws.
Whether the degree of enhanced profitability is too great or not simply cannot
be answered by the empirical evidence and economic theory we have available to
us today. The problem is not that economists are incapable of making a reasonable
calculation of the expected benefits to Intel relative to the expected consumer harm.
That calculation would be difficult, but within reason for qualified economist. But
it would be irrelevant to the question at the core of the conflict between intellectual
property and antitrust law. The issue is not how much ex post rent Intel receives
after it successfully innovates. The issue is the effect that an increase or decrease
in this ex post profit would have on the future, ex ante investment decisions of
other potential innovators. It is this assessment that I claim we are not able make
with any reasonable degree of precision, whether we are concerned with the rule on
refusals to license or the length a patent’s life, or any number of other issues on at
the nexus of of intellectual property and antitrust law.
My general pessimism os about how close we are to getting the rules right. I
am not so pessimistic about what we should do in the meanwhile. There is little
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disagreement that refusals to license can have sometimes substantial anticompeti-
tive effects, which is to say, cause harm to consumer welfare, if the refusing firm
has market power. It is up to Congress to set, and the courts to interpret the
restrictions to be imposed on such refusals. Congress and the courts are unlikely
to happen upon the optimal degree of restriction (or permissiveness) for the rea-
sons described above. However, whatever the political and judicial process decides,
there is reason to be optimistic that economists and lawyers can sensibly interpret
and implement the result. The reason is simple: refusals to license are essentially
equivalent to refusals to deal, and we have learned much about these strategies in
recent years. There are still unresolved questions, but the areas of disagreement
have been rapidly shrinking.
There is at least one important further lesson from the analysis above. For the
implementation of a refusal to license doctrine to be successful, it is important
that the doctrine be developed in economic terms. That is, as with other issues
in antitrust — and intellectual property — policy, the focus should be on the net
impact on consumer welfare. Further, the rules should be formulated in terms that
are amenable to economic analysis. For example, a rule that distinguishes between
refusals that have impact within and those that have impact outside the scope of
a patent will be more effectively workable if scope is defined in terms of relevant
markets. The centrality of economic principles and analysis is justified because
the primary values underlying our intellectual property and antitrust policies are
economic.
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